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The tragic truth about philosophy is that misunderstanding occurs 
more frequently than understanding. Nowhere is this more evident than 
in the reception of Rawls' work. A common misinterpretation of his 
conception of justice as fairness is that it is an application of Kantian moral 
theory to the political structure of society. Viewed in this light, Rawls' 
theory seems to be open to a serious objection. One could argue that as a 
Kantian moral theory justice as fairness is too controversial to generate the 
consensus necessary for contractual agreement. It is controversial 
because it violates the most fundamental liberal requirement: that the 
state remain neutral in regard to competing conceptions of the good.1 A 
critic who pressed this line of argument could then go on to argue that any 
attempt to weaken the moral claims of justice as fairness in order to 
mitigate the controversy, would only undermine the capacity of justice as 
fairness to generate support for itself. The supposed strength of this 
objection is that it reveals that what is problematic in Rawls' theory is only 
symptomatic of the problems faced by liberal political conceptions in 
general. 
Much of Rawls' recent work has been an attempt at correcting this 
mistaken reading and answering this objection. In particular, the essay 
The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus' further clarifies his claim that 
justice as fairness is a political and not a metaphysical moral conception. 
Rawls defines an overlapping consensus as the articulation of that "shared 
basis of consensus on a political conception of justice" which is latent in 
the political culture of a constitutional democracy and which makes 
possible an orderly and stable community (IOC 25). As a political 
conception justice as fairness constitutes an overlapping consensus when 
it is found to be congruent with the variety of moral, philosophical and 
religious views that compose a society. This, in turn, establishes it as non-
controversial. 
But with the introduction of the overlapping consensus Rawls has 
created a problematic ambiguity in the interpretation of his theory. Since 
a political conception of justice is viable to the extent that it is capable of 
generating this overlapping consensus, what is the justificatory role of the 
original position? It no longer appears necessary as a device for deciding 
1 For an excellent discussion on the necessity of the neutrality of the state 
in liberal political conceptions see Larmore, chapter 3, pp. 40-48. (See the 
bibliography for a key to citations.) 
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on the principles of justice. Instead, the appeal can be made directly to 
the principles as ideas already latent in the public political culture. This 
move would no doubt appease many of Rawls's critics who regard the 
original position as the source of most of the controversial metaphysical 
claims of his theory.2 But for Rawls to adopt this strategy, in my view, 
would rob justice as fairness of its critical justificatory feature. That the 
principles of justice are chosen in a fair decision procedure gives them a 
rational and principled superiority over other competing theories. To 
reduce the justification of a conception of justice to a matter of simply 
dredging up the ideas (or preferences) latent in the prevailing political 
culture, would leave justice as fairness open to the charge of merely 
representing the arbitrary and capricious preferences of a society. My 
paper, then, is concerned with what appear to be two opposed patterns of 
justifying the principles of justice in Rawls's recent work. I will argue that 
Rawls has not abandoned the original position, nor does he intend the 
overlapping consensus to be an alternative to it. Rather, they are 
component parts of a two-stage process of justification. 
1. Overlapping Consensus: What is it? 
Rawls starts with the basic presupposition that our historical and social 
situation requires us to conceive of justice in a particular way. Now 
traditionally justice has been conceived as a fragile consensus of self- and 
group-interests (IOC 2). But we have been part of a democratic tradition 
with its well-defined constitutional practices and this calls for something 
more principled. What Rawls has in mind is a "regulative political 
conception of justice that can articulate and order in a principled way the 
political ideas and values of a democratic regime, thereby specifying the 
aims the constitution is to achieve and the limits it must respect" (IOC 1). 
Accordingly the conception he has in mind has three defining features: i) it 
is a political conception, formulated for the purposes of addressing a 
specific subject, i.e., the basic structure of society (IOC 3); ii) as a political 
conception it is not part of any general and comprehensive moral 
conception (IOC 3); and iii) it is formulated in "terms of certain 
fundamental intuitive ideas viewed as latent in the public political culture 
of a democratic society" (IOC 6). Now, for Rawls, the most important of 
these intuitive ideas are the ideas of the person as free and equal and that 
society is a permanent cooperative venture for mutual advantage among 
such persons.3 
2 Sandel, chapter 1, pp. 15-65. 
3 Rawls, in his Dewey Lectures, regards the idea of the person, the idea of 
social cooperation and the original position as the 'model conceptions' 
presupposed by an overlapping consensus. However, for the purposes of 
this paper 1 assume that the reader is aware of this. My main concern here 
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Historically conceptions of justice have been formulated in one of two 
ways. Either it is a balancing of opposed interests or it is the extension of a 
general moral principle to the political realm (IOC 2-5). Rawls argues that 
both approaches are inadequate for the task at hand. A conception of 
justice is supposed to generate a consensus out of the various religious, 
philosophical and moral ideals which compete with each other. On the 
one hand the balancing of interests is always a tenuous arrangement at 
best. It is conceded that the various parties are ready to pursue their 
interests at the expense of each other should the occasion arise. On the 
other hand, extending a moral doctrine to cover the political realm is 
problematic because it espouses ideas and values that are not widely 
shared in a community (IOC 6). At a certain point the right of conscience 
must be violated in order to bring about harmony within the community. 
In both cases, then, their respective conceptions of justice cause conflict 
and inevitably rely upon an oppressive use of force in order to establish 
them (IOC 14). 
Rawls believes that in the case of his political conception of justice 
such outcomes can be avoided. This is because it is designed to 
accommodate a very important fact of contemporary democratic life-
pluralism (IOC 4). In order to achieve this goal, a political conception must 
remain free of so-called 'longstanding controversies' (IOC 13). It must 
allow for a wide variety of general and comprehensive doctrines as well as 
a 'plurality of conflicting and incommensurable' conceptions of the good 
(IOC 4). For Rawls, then, the emphasis will be on the agreement necessary 
for social cooperation and not the truth about the nature of the political. If 
it proves necessary for individuals to assert aspects of their comprehensive 
views, then they are to be given in a minimalist form. 'The question is: 
what is the least that must be asserted; and if it must be asserted, what is 
its least controversial form?" (IOC 8). But this brings us to a serious 
problem: how can such an agreement maintain its efficacy given the lack 
of any unifying principle or interest? In other words, how can a 
constitutional or basic political consensus generate the kind of allegiance 
that will outweigh self- or group-interests on the one hand, and 
moral/religious doctrines on the other? 
Rawls gives two related answers to this question. First, he claims that 
allegiance to a political conception is not necessarily determined by one's 
interests or moral/religious views. In fact, most moral/religious doctrines 
are not fully general and comprehensive views to begin with. This means 
that in many cases one's political conception has nothing (or very little) to 
do with one's other interests and comprehensive views (IOC 18-19). Rawls 
claims that this fact creates a 'slippage,' which allows a political conception 
to loosely cohere with other beliefs (IOC 19). In the event that one does 
is in the relationship between the original position and the overlapping 
consensus in the pattern of justification for 'justice as fairness.' 
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discover a discrepancy between one's political conception and one's other 
immediate views, one is just as likely to revise these immediate views 
rather than the political conception. The reason for this is that one has 
come to value the capacity of the political conception to achieve the public 
good (IOC 19). 
This last point leads to the other reason that Rawls gives for the ability 
of an overlapping consensus to generate allegiance to itself. He claims 
that a political conception, when it effectively regulates basic political 
institutions, meets three requirements essential for a stable constitutional 
regime. First it sets forth the content of basic rights and liberties and gives 
them priority over all other values (IOC 19). In doing this, it places these 
items beyond the debate and calculus of social interests (IOC 19-20). This 
insures that social cooperation will take place on terms of mutual respect 
(IOC 20). Next it meets the requirements of the idea of free public reason 
(IOC 20). In addition to detaching itself from controversial debates, the 
overlapping consensus recognizes certain guidelines of public enquiry and 
rules for assessing evidence (IOC 20). This will include the forms of 
reasoning available to common sense, the non-controversial aspects of 
scientific inquiry, and guarantees of freedom of speech and thought (IOC 
2). Finally the overlapping consensus encourages the 'cooperative virtues 
of political life.' These are the virtues of reasonableness, fairness and a 
spirit of compromise (IOC 21). Social cooperation in terms of mutual 
respect engenders a tendency on the part of others to put aside self-
interested aims in favor of broader social aims. The primary task of a 
political conception of justice, then, is to order the political institutions and 
specify basic rights and liberties. When it has met the three requirements 
of a stable constitutional regime, it attains a fixed quality that enables it to 
affect the political character of its citizens (IOC 21). Allegiance to the 
political conception occurs because the citizens see it as consistent with 
their own mutually opposed views and, consequently, one that will order 
their conduct without sacrificing their self- or moral-interests. A political 
conception of justice becomes an overlapping consensus that operates 
only at the level of the basic structure of society. It cannot assert any 
moral, religious, philosophical or metaphysical doctrines (IOC 7). Nor can 
it take part in any dispute about these matters. Instead, it unites 
incommensurable views of the good into a consensus by locating the point 
at which these views overlap each other (IOC 6). 
The conjecture, then, is that as citizens come to 
appreciate what a liberal conception does, they acquire 
an allegiance to it, an allegiance that becomes stronger 
over time. They come to think it both reasonable and 
wise for them to confirm their allegiance to its principles 
of justice as expressing values that, under the reasonably 
favorable conditions make democracy possible, normally 
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counter-balance whatever values oppose them. With 
this an overlapping consensus is achieved (IOC 22). 
II. The Relationship between the Original Position and the Overlapping 
Consensus. 
From the foregoing it is clear that in articulating the role of the 
overlapping consensus Rawls has also carried out a justification of the 
principles of justice. But it is a much different kind of justification than the 
one given in A Theory of Justice. The most significant change is in Rawls' 
direct appeal to interests that were excluded from consideration in the 
model of the original position. Also, the parties have a rather informed 
view of their place in society, as well as their talents, beliefs, etc. Some 
have speculated that Rawls has given up on the original position in order 
to accommodate criticisms of his theory that: I) the original position, given 
its Kantian formulation, made metaphysical claims that were too 
controversial for agreement; ii) that even if one granted the results of the 
original position, it was not clear why anyone would adhere to the 
agreement once his position in society and interests were known; and 
finally, iii) any attempt to enforce the agreement would be to impose a 
particular conception of the good upon a citizen, thus violating her/his 
right to conscience. Given Rawls' detailed emphasis on the necessity of a 
non-controversial political conception and the very constrained nature of 
the social debate in his analysis of the overlapping consensus, along with 
the disappearance of any sustained discussion of the original position in 
his most recent works, such an interpretation carries a high degree of 
plausibility. This is enhanced when one also considers the standard 
criticism that because the original position stacks the deck in favor of 
justice as fairness by including certain moral conceptions in the 
background, it is not a decision procedure but an expository device. Thus, 
the notion of an overlapping consensus as the justification of the principles 
of justice would go a long way towards accommodating many criticisms 
and appeasing many critics. 
But such an interpretation also rests on a fundamental 
misunderstanding of Rawls' theory. It holds that justice as fairness is an 
application of Kantian moral theory to the basic structure of society. 
However, Rawls is quite explicit that in referring to his theory as 'Kantian,' 
he intends this claim to be understood as an analogy and not an identity. 
This is a crucial distinction. Its significance is best appreciated only when 
considering it in connection with the original position. Only after having 
done this will one be in a position to see that the idea of an overlapping 
consensus is insufficient to justify the principles of justice and requires a 
decision procedure like the original position. 
The original position is a device for deciding which scheme of 
principles is most appropriate "for realizing liberty and equality once 
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society is viewed as a system of cooperation between free and equal 
persons" (JP 235). In order to adequately understand this decision 
procedure, we need to be clear about two aspects of the original position: 
its background assumptions and the conditions that must prevail in order 
to render a fair decision. There are two ideas that constitute the 
background assumptions of the original position. They are the idea of the 
person and the idea of society as a fair system of cooperation (or mutual 
advantage). Cooperation is to be understood in the following way. First it 
is a system guided by publicly recognized rules and procedures. It is not a 
system where orders are issued by a central authority. Second each 
participant may reasonably accept the terms of cooperation, provided that 
the others do the same. Also, it means that those who cooperate must 
benefit in an appropriate way. Finally, each individual is to be guided by 
their own conception of the good (JP 232). 
By person we are to understand the following. First, a person is 
someone who can be a fully cooperating member of society over a 
complete life (or, in other words, a citizen). Second, insofar as these 
persons have the powers of reason, thought and judgement they are free. 
Finally, to the extent that these persons have these powers to the requisite 
degree they are equal (JP 233). 
Now in regard to the background assumptions, Rawls indicates that 
they are nothing more than weak, normative assumptions. They do not 
imply any deep theoretical commitments that would prejudice the 
decision procedure of the original position. In fact, they are simply 
minimal ideas formulated with a view to establishing consensus, ideas that 
all could accept given their various, and in many cases conflicting, 
personal views of the world. This is especially true in regard to the idea of 
the person. Here one is not committed to any deep metaphysical 
conception of the person, Kantian or otherwise. In placing persons behind 
a veil of ignorance one does not come across any doctrine of the person as 
a 'self shorn of all its contingently given attributes' or a self that 'assumes a 
supra-empirical status, given prior to its ends, a pure subject, ultimately 
thin,' as Michael Sandel has suggested (JP 239; see also Sandel 93-95). 
Instead one is simply stating that minimal common ground that must be 
presupposed about the person by all the competing views of the good if 
agreement about a conception of justice is going to be reached in a 
reasonable and principled way. 
This method of minimally stating the background assumptions 
insures that the conditions that prevail in the original position will be such 
that they are not prejudicial to any of the competing schemes of principles 
or to the bargaining position of any of the parties. As we said above, the 
background ideas, although normative (or moral) ones, are to be weak 
minimal statements. The veil of ignorance is employed in order to filter 
out any irrelevant information that arises from the contingencies of the 
social world and would prejudice the decision process (JP 236-237). It acts 
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to constrain the arguments that will be presented so that whichever 
arguments arc successful will be universalizable (within a given society) 
and have undoubted authority in regard to settling which scheme of 
principles is to be chosen. Thus, the participants will have a reflective 
knowledge about themselves, which means they will be abstract or 
representative types and not metaphysical selves. All of this enables the 
original position to exclude threats of force, coercion, deception and fraud 
(JP235). 
Rawls claims that given these restrictions we have a conception of a 
decision procedure which is fair and principled. While it does favor one 
scheme of principles over the others, it does so on the basis that the overall 
balance of reasons is in its favor. Without this device the principles of 
justice would merely reflect the blind and arbitrary preferences of a 
society, which are subject to change by the calculus of social interests. It is 
in this sense that we are to understand that Rawls' theory is 'Kantian by 
analogy.' Clearly he rejects Kant's theoretical claims, but he retains the 
importance of determining a conception of right that can unify and 
generalize our considered convictions in a principled way and that will 
achieve greater mutual agreement and self-understanding (JP 238-239). 
This last point uncovers what lies at the heart of this misinterpretation 
of justice as fairness. Rawls' critics regard the original position as a device 
of abstraction whose function is to articulate that vision of the good which 
all rational and autonomous persons must accept. The conclusions 
produced are binding on the contractual parties. But as we have seen, 
Rawls makes no such claim. Since the original position is only a device of 
representation and the persons in it are not actual persons, the resulting 
agreement is merely hypothetical and nonbinding (JP 238). It is only 
preparatory for underwriting in a principled way, the consensus based on 
real interests that constitutes an agreement on a political conception of 
justice (JP 246-247). The original position represents that neutral ground to 
which we can retreat when our various and conflicting views of the good 
make agreement impossible. It specifies those terms of social cooperation 
which will be acceptable to the competing conceptions of the good. As a 
result contractual parties can be justified in their conviction that: 
within the scope allowed by the basic liberties and the 
other provisions of a just constitution, all citizens can 
pursue their way of life on fair terms and properly 
respect its (non-public) values. So long as those 
constitutional guarantees are secure, they think no 
conflict of values is likely to arise that would justify their 
opposing the political conception as a whole, or on such 
fundamental matters as liberty of conscience, or equal 
political liberties, or basic civil rights, and the like (IOC 
16). 
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The original position, then, is a necessary, but not a sufficient 
condition for justifying a political conception of justice. This is the reason 
why Rawls develops an account of the overlapping consensus in his theory. 
A political conception can never be fully accepted unless it proves itself 
congruent with a variety of conflicting conceptions of the good, both in 
theory and in practice. The overlapping consensus is itself only a 
necessary condition. Its purpose is to show how the principles of justice 
are consistent with the various social interests that one encounters in one's 
actual life. Here is where the allegiance to a conception of justice is 
generated. But without a device like the original position that allegiance 
would lack any principled justification for itself. It would reflect the blind 
and arbitrary preferences of the citizens which would be subject to change 
given the variability of the calculus of social interests. Thus the original 
position and the overlapping consensus constitutes the jointly sufficient 
conditions for laying the foundations for a society which is neither a 
'modus vivendi' nor a general, comprehensive moral order, both of which 
have the tendency of employing coercion in unconscionable ways. Justice 
as fairness offers a principled means of ordering the values of a 
democratic regime, specifying the aims of the constitution and the limits it 
must respect (IOC 1). 
In conclusion it is now clear that the original position and the 
overlapping consensus are not alternative patterns of justification. Nor 
has Rawls abandoned any essential features of the justification of justice 
as fairness. We must read him as claiming that justification is a complex, 
two-stage process (much like that of John Locke's Second Treatise).* This 
version of Rawls' theory is much more powerful and formidable. The 
principles of justice are now seen to mediate the demands of two very 
different levels of consideration. It not only provides the theoretic grounds 
for choosing the principles of justice. It also can claim allegiance from the 
wide and diverse range of interests that constitutes a democratic society. 
Maintaining the analogy to Kant, justice as fairness is not only acceptable 
in theory, but in practice as well. 
4 1 am grateful to Rex Martin for pointing this out to me. One could then 
view the original position as the stage of social contract. This is the point in 
Locke where the parties in the state of nature come together and specify 
the terms of the contract. The overlapping consensus would then be 
viewed as the stage where a constitution is developed and ratified by the 
various parties. 
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